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  Guanxi, Structural Hole and Closure 
 
Abstract 
Purpose — Understanding China’s economic success requires insights into its peculiar 
guanxi-based market. Many scholars are confused how to apply western network theories to 
the Chinese guanxi-based market. This paper contributes to this comprehensive topic by 
theoretically exploring the differences among three fundamental network concepts: (1) guanxi, 
(2) structural hole and (3) closure. 
Design/methodology/approach — Following Heide (1994), we categorize a network into 
three dimensions: (1) network initiation, (2) network maintenance and (3) network 
termination, based on different time phases. We compare the three fundamental network 
concepts in every dimension, laying out detailed similarities and dissimilarities among them. 
Findings — All three networks are initiated either naturally or artificially, but guanxi is 
closely embedded in the Chinese institutions. Unlike structural hole and closure, which can be 
applied at any level, guanxi is a special relation that only exists at the individual level. 
Structural hole and closure highlight networks’ structures which bring them various benefits 
and constrains. Such merits are not evident in guanxi in which favor exchange plays a crucial 
role in connecting entities. In addition, guanxi has a special rule to affect the strength of ties. 
Originality/value — The purpose of this paper is to articulate the differences among guanxi, 
structural hole, and closure. With our systematic framework, we offer a platform to scholars 
who are interested in applying the western network theory to guanxi-based market, and our 
work also provides non-Chinese who are doing business in China with new insights. 
Keywords: Guanxi, Structural Hole, Closure 
Paper type: Conceptual Paper  
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Introduction 
 
During the last decade the world has witnessed an unprecedented shift in economic power 
from the west to the east. Asian economies represented by rapidly emerging China, have 
become the world’s new economic engine. The global financial crisis did not seem to bite the 
same way in China as it did in the West. The growth in East Asia is fascinating and is 
expected to continue in the foreseeable future. These Asian countries (e.g. China, Japan, 
South Korea, and several Southeast Asian countries), which are deeply affected by Confucian 
culture, have their own ways to organize business networks and transactions (Luo, 2007). 
This way is called Guanxi1
 Network theory is a hot topic in strategy and management research, and it also provides 
important insights into business markets (Håkanssen et al., 2009). Numerous special issues 
and edited volumes describe network theory in different ways (Smith-Doerr and Powell, 
2003). Thorelli (1986:38) defines network as “consisting of nodes or positions (occupied by 
firms, households, strategic business units inside a diversified concern, trade associations and 
other types of organizations) and links manifested by interaction between the positions”. 
Gulati et al. (2000:203) state that “Networks encompass a firm’s set of relationships, both 
horizontal and vertical, with other organizations—be they suppliers, customers, competitors, 
or other entities—including relationships across industries and countries”. Since the 1980s, a 
series of writings from Burt (1987; 1992) and Coleman (1988) have provoked people’s 
attention and let the idea that business network plays critical role in firms’ strategy spread 
widely. Burt’s structural hole and Coleman’s closure as academic paradigms have been tested 
by scholars numerous times from a variety of aspects, showing that the theories can be 
applied in various industries and in different geographic regions (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Powell et 
al., 1996).  
. “In China, transactions often follow successful guanxi, while in 
the west a relationship follows successful transactions” (Park and Luo, 2001:457).  In this 
paper, we will analyze Guanxi-based markets by applying various types of concepts from 
network theory, trying to solve some Asian puzzles that are hard to understand by western 
scholars and business people. 
 Therefore, considering that both Burt and Coleman’s thoughts are, by and large, 
established on the western business contexts characterized by “self-seeking and egocentric 
                                                 
1 Guanxi (Chinese), Kankei (Japanses), and Kwankye (Korean) have similar meanings. 
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agents with little sense of obligation to others” (Xiao and Tsui, 2007:4), a question occurs that, 
if business context shifts from western countries to eastern Asian countries, say China, in 
which collectivism is used to be the backbone of society life rather than individualism, do 
such network theories still apply?  
Although the answers to the question are many (Chua et al., 2009), surprisingly, only a few 
papers give us a depth of discussion from a basic view point that exploits the essential 
difference between guanxi and the western network—structural hole and closure. Clearly, 
clarifying such differences is required in order to develop new understanding of guanxi-based 
market, as well as to expand network theory itself.  
Our paper is designed to uncover such differences. Based on previous works, especially the 
typology used by Heide (1994) in his transaction cost research in interorganizational 
governance, we divide network/guanxi into three phases: (1) initiation of network/guanxi, (2) 
maintenance of network/guanxi, and (3) termination of network/guanxi, and then we 
systematically compare structural hole, closure and guanxi.  
The article is organized as follows: in the next section, we briefly present three definitions 
of guanxi, structural hole, and closure individually; in section three, we compare the three 
types of business relationships at every phase. Case illustrations of the network types as 
applied in a Chinese context are also included; and in the last section we present our 
conclusions. 
Three Definitions 
 
Guanxi—Guanxi is a special relationship, but it is far more than the concept of relationship 
that is well known to us. An existing relationship may not be a guanxi, for instance, two 
classmates who never contact each other after graduation have a relationship (at least, a weak 
tie), but may not have guanxi. For clearly understanding “what is guanxi”, we lay out several 
definitions of guanxi. Bell (2000:133) calls guanxi  “a mechanism by which individuals are 
able to achieve personal, family, or business objective”. In their writing, Yeung and Tung 
(1996:55) define guanxi as “the establishment of a connection between two independent 
individuals to enable a bilateral flow of personal or social transactions. However, both parties 
must derive benefits from the transaction to ensure the continuation of such a relationship”. 
Davies (1995:22) defines guanxi as “the social interactions within the network place and its 
members in the equivalent of an infinitely repeated game with a set of people they know”. 
Moreover, Yang (1994:1) illustrates that “guanxi means literally a relationship between 
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objects, forces, or persons. When it is used to refer to relationships between people, not only 
can it be applied to husband-wife, kinship and friendship relations, it can also have the sense 
of social connections, dyadic relationships that are based implicitly (rather than explicitly) on 
mutual interest and benefit. Once guanxi is established between two people, each can ask a 
favor of the other with the expectation that the debt incurred will be repaid sometime in the 
future”. 
Guanxi generally is classified into three types: family, helper and business guanxi (Fan, 
2002). Family guanxi is mostly blood based, like parents, children, brothers, daughters-in-law 
and so on. Helper guanxi is social based, like relatives, friends, teachers, students, classmates 
and so forth. Business guanxi is a process that finds solutions for some business through 
personal connections. Business guanxi is based on personal gain and loss, and examples could 
be suppliers, customers, business partners etc. Furthermore, Peng and Luo (2000:486) 
demonstrate that, in business guanxi, the Chinese managers' micro interpersonal ties with 
government officials help improve organizational performance. Thus business guanxi in the 
Chinese meaning differs fundamentally from business relationships as commonly conceived 
in the West. 
Closure—“Networks with closure—that is to say networks in which everyone is connected 
such that no one can escape the notice of others, which in operational terms usually means a 
dense network—argued to be the source of social capital” (Burt, 2000:351). 
Closure has two basic functions. One is that it is close to the source of information. 
Coleman (1988:104) explains “an important form of social capital is the potential for 
information that inheres in social relations”. He continues: “A person who is not greatly 
interested in current events but who is interested in being informed about important 
developments can save the time required to read a newspaper if he can get the information he 
wants from a friend who pays attention to such matters” (ibid). The second function is 
strengthening trust by sanctioning behaviors that benefit decreasing risky within the network. 
Members who connect to each other with the form of closure in the same network could both 
monitor and be monitored by others.  According to Coleman’s theory, “members of a closely 
knit network can trust each other to honor obligations, which diminish the uncertainty of their 
exchanges and enhance their ability to cooperate in the pursuit of their interests” (Gargiulo 
and Benassi, 2000:184).  
Structural Hole—Structural hole is another kind of network. Structural hole as a term was 
coined by Burt (1992:18) whose definition is “a structural hole is a relationship of non 
redundancy between two contacts”.  
5 
 
Burt (1992) assumes that effective cooperation between firms is deeply affected by the 
selection of partners. In Burt’s view, benefits would be decreased if a network puts constraint 
on relationships within it. Firms with structural holes have higher economic gains due to 
effectively filtering redundant information out and freely choosing tactics and strategies. 
The most significant benefit to those who have structural hole at hand is “broker benefit”, 
that is the broker has opportunity to control and spread information within a network for 
maximizing his benefit. As Gargiulo and Bennassi (2000:184) said: “Rather than stressing the 
utility of consistent norms fostered by cohesive networks, structural hole theory claims that 
the benefits of social capital result from the diversity of information and the brokerage 
opportunities created by the lack of connection between separate clusters in a social network”. 
For clearly presenting the differences among these three concepts, we offer a concrete 
example about Zhongguancun in Beijing (see Textbox 1), which reflects how the Chinese use 
guanxi, structure hole, and closure simultaneously.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences Among Guanxi, Structural Hole, and Closure 
 
Networks could be categorized into three dimensions: (1) network initiation, (2) network 
maintenance and (3) network termination based on different time phases (Heide, 1994). The 
first phase is about how to initiate a network. A network may be created by some natural 
reasons, or may be totally an “artificial product”, or a mixed body of both. The second phase 
— maintaining network includes: (1) positioning roles, meaning how to reasonably specify 
Textbox 1:  Case of Zhongguancun: guanxi, structural hole, and closure 
Zhongguancun IT cluster is located in Beijing, China. It is, to a large extent, a closure, as 
most entrepreneurs in this area have been working before in R&D institutes of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences and universities. They possess excellent technological knowledge and 
use them in creative ways. This is a dense network with guanxi – everybody seems to be 
connected to everyone to facilitate their success by using guanxi “infrastructure”, because 
most often they are graduates of Peking University and Tsinghua University. However, the 
dense guanxi network does not hinder CEOs, in particular those startups, from creating and 
manipulating structure holes by seeking undiscovered business opportunities. Beijing Hi-
World Software Technology (BHWST), a company in Zhongguancun, offers us a vivid 
example. At the beginning, BHWST was a construction company, but its CEO soon realized 
that “there is no software company in China that writes software for tall buildings. 
Construction firms do not engage in software development, and software programmers 
overlook this niche of the market”. BHWST’s CEO began to “dig a hole” between software 
business and construction business, which subsequently brought considerable revenues to the 
company.  
Draw on Batjargal (2007:611), and re-edited by the authors 
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and assign entities with certain roles in a network; (2) nature of operation, meaning to make 
sure the network runs smoothly, and to adjust mistakes made by network participants 
confronting varying circumstances and contingencies from time to time; (3) in monitoring 
procedures, participants more or less play the “game” under the third party’s monitoring; (4) 
incentive system refers to what stimulates participants to maintain relations. The last phase is 
“how to end a network relation”. Table 1 summarizes the entire process. 
 
Table 1: Dimensions and Types of Networks 
Types of Networks  Dimension 
 Guanxi Structural Hole Closure 
1. Network Initiation  Culture and 
institution reasons 
 
 
Objective and 
subjective reasons 
Objective and 
subjective reasons 
2. Network Maintenance      
2.1 Positioning Roles  Individual level; 
To be 
broker/friend; 
Unbalanced 
power/obligation 
 
 
 
 
Any level; 
To be broker; 
Unbalanced 
power/information 
Any level; 
To be friend; 
 Balanced 
power/information 
2.2 Nature of Operation  To be sensitive of 
Chinese culture 
 
 
Content and 
connection 
Build trust and 
reputation 
2.3 Monitoring Procedures  Internal 
mechanism; 
“Voluntariness” 
 
 
Internal mechanism; 
“Calculation” 
External mechanism; 
“Penalty” 
2.4 Incentive System  Long term benefit  Short term benefit Long term benefit 
3. Network Termination  No return favors; 
Lose face 
 
 
Costs; Ties’ strength Violate 
 
Network Initiation 
Deeply influenced by traditional Confusion culture, to Chinese initiating guanxi that brings 
reciprocal benefits is, often superior to constructing structural hole or closure. Under this 
institution, three types of guanxi are initiated: Family is the first place that generates guanxi, 
and such guanxi is the most solid and nature, e.g., parent-children, husband-wife etc. Family 
guanxi is a basic network that supports family member’s development as well as offers a 
platform for expanding their external network. The second type of guanxi is “helper”. A 
helper might be contingently formed, like relationships of classmates, colleagues etc. But it 
may also be artificially formed, like one of your intimate friends introduces one of his (her) 
friends to you, and then you have close contact with your friend’s friend. The third kind of 
guanxi is business oriented which is mixed by artificial and natural reasons. A significant 
example is a purely commercial guanxi between suppliers and retailers, with the sole purpose 
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of making money. However, business guanxi is unstable, especially if there are few social 
interactions (e.g., favor exchanges) among business actors. Many Western managers doing 
business with the Chinese, found that legal contracts were not enough to achieve good 
business results (Bjorkman and Kock, 1995). Furthermore, managers also found that business 
guanxi leads actors in the same business treat each other as outsiders, and such kind of guanxi 
is fragile and can easily be broken (Yau et al., 2000).  
Both objective reasons and subjective reasons impose effects on structural holes’ initiation. 
Burt (2005) sketches several reasons why structural holes are naturally formed: (1) 
information circulates faster within groups than between groups (Burt, 2002); (2) limited time 
and energy constrain people to maintain connections with all stakeholders (Granovetter, 1983); 
(3) variations in beliefs and practices occur at individual level, as well as at group level. All in 
all, people can only “trace” several certain ties, but lose “track” of other people/groups. 
Furthermore, after people realize that structural hole might benefit themselves from two 
aspects well-known as “easy access to information” and “control capability”, they have 
momentum to: (1) delay the hole’s decay (Burt, 2002); (2) deliberately create and build new 
bridges with unconnected or remote entities. Although maintaining structural holes to some 
extent is costly (Burt, 2002), an abundant number of papers has demonstrated that the holes 
bring vast benefits to people (Burt, 1997; 2007) and to companies  (Ahuja, 2000). 
Closure, which is similar to structural hole, has been either formed objectively or formed 
subjectively. Inherently everyone is more or less embedded in some relationships. In 
particular, those relations people cannot choose but bear naturally, for instance family 
relations and kinships. You do not choose your family, you are born into it. From another 
aspect, closures might also be built by objective reasons. With passage of time, brokers may 
give up structural holes for gaining benefits yielded by closed ties and dense networks which 
are more stable and involve more trust and reputation. Moreover, those entities, who 
communicate with each other via the brokers who control and bridge the holes, might also 
build mutual or multiple relations themselves for virtues like direct information, reducing cost, 
etc. 
The case of Australian Sydney Corporation (see Textbox 2) reveals the different logics of 
initiating business networks in a Chinese context. 
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Network Maintenance 
 
Positioning Roles 
Positioning roles concerns two issues. From a macro point of view, the three concepts have 
various applicable scopes—structural hole and closure assign roles to firms as well as to 
individuals, while guanxi is only relevant to individuals; from a micro view, under different 
networks, different entities have different powers and hierarchies. 
From a macro aspect, referring to structural hole per se and closure per se Gnyawali and 
Madhavan (2001:433) clearly point out “the network approach is potential for multi-level 
analysis—that is actor-level, pair-level, and network-level analyses”. For instance, Coleman 
(1988) exemplifies that children, whose families are in the community that provides cohesive 
network connecting local families, have less possibility to drop out of high school (individual 
level). And in Walker et al. (1997)’s case, biotechnology startups are inclined to form closure 
rather than to exploit structural holes (group level). Meanwhile, the corresponding findings 
from the point of view of structural holes show that the holes benefit bankers and managers in 
their early promotion and income (Burt, 2007); and at group level, for instance, “investment 
banks benefit from structural hole positions, and that those banks that occupy disadvantaged 
positions are likely to endeavor to span structural holes to gain network advantage” (Baum et 
al., 2003:720). But, the Chinese guanxi is barely “pegged” to interpersonal relationships, such 
as family members, friends, classmates, hometown-mates, business partners, etc. Firms in 
China do have business relations organized by formal and informal rules and customs, like 
Textbox 2: Case of Australian Sydney Corporation 
Australian Sydney Corporation (ASD), a lubricant manufacturing company operating 
in China, had difficulty finding distributors because of the country’s newly 
developing market infrastructure and the resistance of Chinese to doing business with 
strangers. ASD’s manager described: in the beginning, we advertised heavily in 
newspapers and magazines, but nothing came of it. We then tried to send sales agents 
to various cities to push our products. But because we had no established guanxi, the 
effort was in vain, even though we spent a lot of money on the operation. Later, we 
developed guanxi with a person in charge of a division in the department of 
commerce in Beijing. He introduced us to a local distributor who he has guanxi with. 
Subsequently, the distributor agreed to put our products on the market, but only 
because of his guanxi with the person in the department of commerce in Beijing. The 
distributor’s personal assessment of the quality of our products was largely 
immaterial. 
Pearce and Robinson (2000:32-33), re-edited by the authors  
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written contract and product reputation, but firms do not have guanxi, which relies on guanxi 
base and involves dyadic and unlimited rounds of favor exchanges. 
From a micro aspect, participants in guanxi take unbalanced positions in power and 
obligation. No matter whether it is the simplest guanxi that merely involves a person who asks 
a favor and a person who offers a favor, or a complex relation that starts from a favor asker to 
several “brokers” and finally to favor giver, such unevenness is very prominent. Favor askers 
use guanxi to fix the problem they have because either they do not know how to get and 
indentify useful information, or even if they were able to master good information, they might 
lack capability to fix the problem. Conversely, favor givers, for one thing, have such 
information and ability to help others maximize profits. Furthermore, favor givers could 
reassure themselves that they may receive reciprocal returns in future. In real life, by 
collecting questionnaires from 364 Chinese executives, Luo (2003) points out that such 
unbalanced guanxi positions are significant especially when the business environment has 
high uncertainty, high competitive pressure, and low production capacity utilization. Xin and 
Pearce (1996) have similar opinion, and they show us that the big and state owned firms are 
superior in guanxi roles, comparing to small and private firms.  
The essence of structural hole theory is that entities should position themselves at a place 
which connects separated parties. Structural holes inherently create advantages in achieving 
unbalanced information, as well as power. Information advantages consist of three 
perspectives (Burt, 1992; 1997; 2007): (1) access benefits: the broker reaches a vast number 
people with direct and indirect means; and furthermore, the information is broad and of high 
quality as little redundant information would be shared and received by the broker; (2) timing 
benefits: the broker is the first ones who “touch” the news about new innovation and market 
demand; (3) referral benefits: the broker is the “candidate for inclusion in new opportunities” 
(Burt, 1997:342). Besides information advantages, structural holes also provide control 
benefits: this means the broker could decide and adjust each contract, and he/she is the person 
who “adds value by brokering the connection between other” (Burt, 1997:342).  
The closure stands on the opposite side to structural hole. People in closed networks could 
be imagined as the relationship between intimate friends: they know each other quite well, 
and have mutual trust, and there is almost no secret within the network. An extreme case is 
that when a piece of news enters into a closure, everyone in the network has access to the 
news; moreover, the news could be spread with only one version (Coleman, 1988).  
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Nature of Operation 
In this sub-section, we will try to shed light on the means with which firms operate their 
normal business activities and adjust their interactions with others. 
Guanxi might be very hard to operate and adjust. Guanxi is a culture, an attitude, and a 
social custom. It is not like structural hole and closure which are somehow measurable (for 
more details, see Burt (2001:33), the density table of relations within and between groups). 
Perhaps one reason is that the change of guanxi network is hard to detect. A guanxi network 
normally consists of strong ties, weak ties, structural holes, and closure. On one side, such 
network is too complex to trace trajectory of changing, like strong tie turns to weak tie, and 
sometimes structural hole is filled up etc; on the other side, even guanxi is a reciprocal 
relation, it is not a precise mathematical formulation like “investment-return” function. The 
reciprocal obligation in guanxi is quite vague, and people just deal with it according to their 
personal experiences. Therefore, we only offer a principle of operating guanxi network, that is, 
learning more about the Chinese business culture and following Confusion philosophy. 
Brokers who control a vast number of structural holes, have two ways to operate their 
networks. The first way relates to adapting to the shift of properties of ties (Emirbayer and 
Goodwin, 1994). Content of ties is a broad idea revealing basic issues that affect business 
networks. For instance, strong or weak relations, and frequent or infrequent ties (Granovetter, 
1983); other methods also include that of adapting to environment that contains ties (Adler 
and Kwon, 2002), learning tacit institutions related to ties (Burt, 1997), and so on. The second 
way looks much more “aggressive”, that is seeking to modify or change the network’s 
structures. The premise argues that structural holes might bring monopolistic advantages in 
information and control for brokers. Therefore, in accordance with network theory (Baum et 
al., 2003), say two firms belonging to two unconnected groups might “dig” a hole together, 
either when they hope to integrate their resources and exploit a new market beyond the two 
groups, or the two firms have incentives to  re-locate their positions in their own markets; or if 
the two firms are big and influential ones, through building structural hole they could create a 
relatively stable environment that improves their competitiveness. For example, Baum et al. 
(2003) have an example that “commuter airlines that serve (enter) more markets are more 
likely to have (establish) multi-market ties with other commuter airlines not because of any 
international effort by their strategists to develop such ties, but because they are more likely to 
encounter the same competitors in multiple markets than airlines operating in fewer markets” 
(ibid:704). 
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Against structural hole, closure emphasizes to build intensive networks. It also has two 
issues that we need to think about. First, an entity in a closure should know others who are in 
the same network, the more the better. Therefore, in closure, firms are more well behaved and 
are less affected by other sources of information that firms in structural hole (Haunschild and 
Beckman, 1998). Second, the entity should also help the third parties build dyadic or mutual 
connections, and such network with high density, according to Coleman (1988), would benefit 
all members in the closure. Closure is relatively simple to adjust, and the core is building trust 
and reputation. Communication is the most effective “weapon”, through which an entity who 
masters more information, has a high possibility to become a helper and a medium of 
information diffusing.  
Monitoring Procedures 
If only concerned about guanxi without consideration of corruption, monitoring guanxi is a 
hard and an almost impossible task. External monitoring mechanism (or the third party 
monitoring mechanism) has little influence on guanxi. No one has the right to interfere in a 
legal “person to person” relationship. Furthermore, such monitoring mechanism is unfeasible: 
an individual’s guanxi could be treated as one’s privacy which is normally intangible and 
would not be shared with the third party. That means it is hard for external mechanism to find 
“where is guanxi”. Internal monitoring mechanism is applied here. In spite of favor askers 
having little power to monitor favor givers; and in spite of favor givers, on the other hand, 
who have places which are superior to those favor askers, have no reason to accept 
monitoring from the askers. The two sides in one guanxi would be self monitored for keeping 
a balanced guanxi “trade off” in a long term. 
We cannot say that there are no external monitoring impacts which would affect broker’s 
advantages given by structural holes, like notably a firm’s centrality in its network 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994), the network’s density (Coleman, 1990), and cultural institution 
(Xiao and Tsui, 2007) constrain the firm’s momentum to conduct opportunist behaviors. 
However, if we only concentrate on the broker, and consider the issue from the micro level, a 
simple reality is that there is no external monitoring system—such as an exact third party—
that has the power to monitor a structural hole network. But, seeing from another side, a 
broker has some indicators with which he could monitor his own holes. So, this is an internal 
private monitoring procedure in which two variables are undeniably important: constraints, 
and structural equivalent. Constraint means the extent to which a firm “is directly or indirectly 
concentrated in a single contact” (Burt, 1997:347), the more constraint, lesser structural holes 
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(see Burt, 1992, for details). Structural equivalence exists when relationship patterns that 
belong to one actor are similar with other actors’ patterns (Rice and Aydin, 1991). Unlike 
variable of constraint which quantitatively sketches structural holes, structural equivalence 
maps the structural holes’ qualities, for instance, structurally equivalent firms have little 
likelihood to initiate aggressive competitions, as well as to respond positively in the face of 
business challenges (Dutton and Jackson, 1987).  
Closure, usually, relies on external monitoring mechanism. Coleman (1988) shows us that 
the closure network itself is like a big “monitoring system”. Theoretically, every one in a 
closure network has no privacy, no secret, and any information in closures is equally spread 
among individuals—every one knows what you are thinking about, your behaviors, as well as 
you know all others’ information in any perspective. Living in a closure network, a person 
must follow the rules, principles and culture which are well accepted by all members in the 
network. Besides such kind of self-monitoring, members should also offer information to 
others who are in the same network, like in Coleman’s “parent-children” example, the parents 
exchange the information they know through frequent contacts. 
Incentive System 
Structural hole is no doubt a kind of network that puts huge amount of attention on short term 
benefit. Structural hole can only exist for a short period of time as there are many possibilities 
that new connections appear between those who do not know each other. Brokers understand 
that the information advantage and control advantage brought by structural holes could not 
last forever. Based on the outcome the structural holes yield, brokers make decisions about 
when and how to give up old structural holes and to develop and organize new holes. 
Closure is expected for chasing long term benefit. Coleman (1988:98-100), for instance, 
portraits a market named Khalili in Cairo, in which “family relations are important in the 
market, as is the stability of proprietorship”. If someone only chases short term benefit but 
ignores following the principles, rules and culture, he/she may “lose family, religious, and 
community ties” (ibid) and “in the absence of these ties, elaborate and expensive bonding and 
insurance devices would be necessary—or else the transactions could not take place” (ibid). 
Guanxi is a combination of structural hole and closure in terms of incentive system. 
Guanxi treats output and behavior equally important. Many scholars agree that guanxi is a 
long term game (Hammond and Glenn, 2004), and entities must carefully develop, cultivate 
and maintain it. After all, in Confucian philosophy, a transaction often follows a successful 
guanxi (but not vice versa).  When guanxi is broken, the corresponding businesses easily 
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come to an end. Additionally, when a guanxi is broken, restoring it is fairly tough work: 
ending a guanxi implies that the trust between two parties “goes to bankrupt”. Therefore, 
normally, businessmen wish to develop and maintain long term guanxi, which helps them 
build their reputation in business. 
At the end of this subsection, we use the Motorola case (see Textbox 3) to exemplify how 
to maintain guanxi in China over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Termination 
The excuses of ending a guanxi could be many and varied. First, there is no free lunch in the 
world. Guanxi requires favor askers to return favors and to favor givers in some certain time 
with some approaches. If someone just wants to receive supports from others, but refuses to 
provide reciprocal help when others are in trouble, then such kind of “unidirectional” guanxi 
would soon disappear. Second, some mistakes may also result in guanxi termination, for 
instance, a common thing is that of letting someone lose “face”2
                                                 
2 lose face means “to not maintain your reputation and the respect of others” 
(http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/lose+face) 
. Third, there are still other 
issues that influence termination of a guanxi, for instance as we have mentioned in prior 
paragraphs, geographic distance: two intimate friends may have less and less favorable 
Textbox 3: Case of Motorola 
Loss of face results in the degradation and possible dissolution of the guanxi 
relationship. Because guanxi serves as a lubricant for exchange, the cultivating 
relationships with Chinese bureaucrats. Former CEO Robert Galvin took his first trip 
to China in October 1986, and since that time, Motorola identified and befriended 
three generations of potential top leaders. In 1989, Motorola was set to build its first 
factories in Tianjin. The Tiananmen Square incident leads U.S. government to sever 
diplomatic relations with China. A corresponding withdrawal by Motorola of its 
commitment to build in China would have caused the numerous Chinese bureaucrats 
working with Motorola to lose face. However, unlike many Western companies that 
decided to remove their Chinese business, although Motorola delayed construction of 
the factories for two years, it never withdrew its commitment to do so. In order to “re-
enter” the Chinese market, Motorola would have had to start completely a new 
rebuilding the guanxi network it so carefully nurtured. In the realm of guanxi, China 
never has forgotten Motorola’s loyalty. By 1997, Motorola’s investment in China was 
$1.3 billion, double the next largest U.S. investor, Atlantic Richfield. Furthermore, 
Motorola was the first foreign firm to insist on full-ownership for a manufacturing 
operation. 
Draw on Standifird and Marshall (2000:24-36), and re-edited by the authors 
 
14 
 
exchanges after their graduation because they stay in two different continents. In such a 
situation, the guanxi network between these two persons weakens gradually. In addition, 
Tsang (1998:70) notes “since guanxi is a crucial company resource, it is worthwhile for senior 
management to audit their company’s guanxi with its outside stakeholders, such as customers, 
suppliers, and government bodies”. It is important to note that guanxi is developed by 
people’s interpersonal relations, not by the companies themselves. 
In his article Bridge Decay, Burt (2002) outlines his network decay theory, in which he 
lists some primary factors that might terminate structural holes. The first thing is high 
maintenance cost. “Research on the tendency for people to have relations with people like 
themselves implies that bridges require more effort to maintain” (Burt, 2002:344). The second 
is that such kind of high maintenance cost can only be shared by few people—more precisely, 
the two parties who are in the two sides of the hole/bridge. On the contrary, in cohesive 
network, the cost is borne by all parties. The third aspect is about the strength of the tie—is it 
a strong tie or a weak tie? Normally, strong ties mean heavy interactions between two entities, 
and weak ties mean that the two entities interact with each other infrequently (Granovetter, 
1983). Structural holes characterized by strong ties would survive for a long period of time as 
“people who have learned to appreciate one another, which increases the probability of 
relationship continuing into the future” (Burt, 2002:343). Weak ties, vice versa, either weaken 
holes’ impacts, or develop into strong ties. In addition, in accordance with small world theory 
(Barabasi and Bonareau, 2003), the network itself roughly keeps balance between structural 
holes and closure. Baum et al. (2003) exemplify a case: a core firm which connects a lot of 
peripheral firms enjoys information and controls advantage by owning structural holes. The 
peripheral firms, for reducing dependence on the core firm, have momentum and motivation 
to fill in the hole with building direct connections to each other. Such behaviors then naturally 
deprive the core firm of broker benefits.  
Closure generally will last for a long time, but if an entity violates the common principles, 
rules and culture, then the closure belonging to the entity is gone. In Coleman’s (1988) 
diamond market story, if someone steals a gemstone from the market, then the person losses 
his closure—others no longer trust him, and his reputation is ruined. 
In Textbox 4, a Chinese manager recalled his experience about a merger between a U.S. 
and a Chinese company. This case shows how guanxi relations can terminate when 
confronted with different network logics. 
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we have compared the differences between guanxi, structural hole and closure. 
Guanxi is based on Chinese interpersonal relations of favors, while structural hole and closure 
are based on western contractual logic of benefits and costs. Thus, western network concepts 
cannot easily be applied in Chinese guanxi-based markets. Perhaps this explains why so many 
western companies initially fail while doing business in China. By the same token, Chinese 
companies may experience some problems while doing business in the West.   
According to our comparative network framework, we would like to highlight several main 
points:  
Institutions—Institutions including custom, religion, and legislation etc. have vast 
influence on networks. Such influence exists in networks from beginning to end. The Chinese 
resort to guanxi primarily because of its relatively less sophisticated legal system in which 
people have no choice but to rely on interpersonal relations to get things done. Further, the 
principle of doing others a favor when it is necessary, and returning favors to those who 
helped you, is also advocated by Confucian philosophy. In contrast, western business 
networks operate within well established legal systems and rely on formally contractual logic. 
In the western institutional context, contractual business methods become superior to 
depending on interpersonal relationships.  
Scope of application— In accordance with guanxi theory, guanxi only exists at the 
interpersonal level, or more precisely, guanxi is a rule/custom dealing with interpersonal 
relationship. Firms which interact with others have business relationships that could be either 
Textbox 4: Case of a merger between a U.S. and a Chinese company 
Soon after the merger between a U.S. and our Chinese company the first conflict 
occurred. Our company’s biggest customer in China with whom we have had a very 
good business relationship for more that 3 years, asked us for an extension of their 
credit period from 60 to 90 days. Such a request normally was handled by our credit 
control department according to set procedures and included a review of the 
creditability record of the respective company. It normally took half a month. After 
the merger, our U.S. partner handled such requests and refused to extend the credit. 
The reason given was that it would slow down the company’s cash flow. Our 
customer was angry, and our commercial team was sad that the company gave up the 
biggest customer so easily in such a competitive market. In addition, our finance 
manager felt that apparently they did not trust anything she told them regarding local 
business operations. They always wanted the check with other sources such as 
lawyers etc. to verify it. We thought this was a waste of time and a sign of not 
respecting our know-how. More and more Chinese sales managers started to leave the 
company, and the merger ended in a mess. 
Hoivik, (2007:463) 
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formally set down by written contracts or informally built by exchanging tacit knowledge, but 
they do not have guanxi. Nevertheless, structural hole and closure extend from individual 
level to group level. These two theories treat network participants as nodes which sometimes 
are homogenous, meaning the node’s characteristics to some extent could be ignored.  
Position in networks—Structural hole theory requires individual entity to occupy 
intermediate position for pursuing information and control advantages. In contrast, closure 
theory pushes individual entity to live in a densely embedded network for cultivating trust and 
reducing uncertainty and opportunism. Thus, according to these two theories, entities’ 
positions in the network to a large extent determine their benefits. Nevertheless, in guanxi, 
position as a factor does not have any vital effects. Guanxi has a peculiar way—favor 
exchange—to run dyadic or multiple interpersonal relations. Thus, guanxi uses psychological 
distance to initiate relations (Chen and Chen, 2004) which also weakens effects caused by 
physical position. A salient example is family guanxi: imagine that a husband is a broker in a 
network, and then his wife, even if totally isolated from the network, has a high possibility to 
access her husband’s broker advantages. 
Strength of ties—In all three networks the content of the ties is also very important. A 
notable factor is that the western network theories judge strength of tie by using time and 
energy, e.g., the indicator of “constraint” quantitatively calculates the degree of “strength”. 
However, in guanxi, the strength is naturally ranked by family member, helper, and business 
partners in terms of closeness. Thus, guanxi as an interpersonal relation is difficult to model 
quantitatively. 
An interesting observation is that the studies of structural hole, closure and Chinese guanxi 
all began in the 1980s—Coleman (1988; 1990) put the foundation stone on closure; and Burt 
(1987; 1992) stood at the opposite side of Coleman by saying structural hole brings us broker 
benefit, and China, at that time, was just opening its doors to the world, and such “open door” 
policy attracted researchers’ interest in the Chinese business context. Previous research 
mostly focuses on differences between social network and the Chinese guanxi, or on testing 
western social network theory in a Chinese context. None of them give us an integrated 
framework explaining structural hole, closure, and the Chinese guanxi simultaneously. Our 
paper elaborates on such differences with the logic that every network would experience three 
phases; initiation—maintenance—termination. Although guanxi can visually be mapped in 
the same way as hole or closure structure, the three network concepts are vastly different. 
Thus, researching and applying network theories in guanxi-based market still has a long to go. 
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